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Introduction 
―…Precisely because there exists such a world [in 
which humanity ‗has chosen to neglect the signifi-
cance of religious [spiritual] understanding of the 
cosmos‘—namely the modern world, … which bears 
the primary responsibility for the global destruction of 
the environment—we have sought to delve into a his-
torical study of both philosophy and science in the 
West that, beginning with views similar to the philos-
ophies and sciences of other civilizations, developed 
in what can only be called an anomalous manner from 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries onward [as 
Modernism]. It moved away from the almost univer-
sally held view of the sacredness of nature to one that 
sees man as alienated from nature and nature itself as 
no longer the progenitor of life (the very root of na-
ture being from the Latin nascitura, meaning to 
give birth), but rather as a lifeless mass, a machine 
to be dominated and manipulated by a purely earthly 
man. It also divorced, in a manner not to be seen in 
any other civilization, the laws of nature from moral 
laws and human ethics from the workings of the cos-
mos,‖ (Nasr, 1996, p.4). 
-S. H. Nasr 
―Idealism and matter of fact are… not sundered, but 
inseparable, as our daily steps are guided by ideals of 
direction,‖ (Geddes, 1915, p.vii). 
-Sir Patrick Geddes 
Barnesmoore (2016a) problematizes biocentrist, 
materialist conceptions of humans, human nature and 
social order in Modernity and subsequently provides a 
new theory of humanity and human evolution that is 
sensitive to the potential for rational beings to direct 
free will towards conscious evolution (towards epis-
temological evolution) and to, in so doing, transcend 
reflexive articulation by the form of mechanical evo-
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lution (‗biological evolution‘). In short, we re-conce-
ptualize the biological animal-human of Modernity as 
an epistemological rational-human. Moving from this 
conception of humans as epistemological beings, this 
paper highlights the necessary role of ideas (theory) in 
expanding and constraining potential for action (prac-
tice) as well as the implications of this relations-
hip between theory and practice for social and aca-
demic revolutions (i.e., for counter-hegemonic move-
ments). In other words, we argue that a revolution of 
ideas (theories) must necessarily precede a revolution 
of practice as our ideas (theories) expand and con-
strain our potentials for conceptualization of practice 
(in the words of Geddes (1915, p.vii) ―our daily steps 
are guided by ideals of direction‖). After providing a 
theoretical framework for understanding the contem-
porary dynamics of academic and social revolution 
through discussion of the terms ‗hegemony‘ and ‗dia-
lectical hegemony,‘ we turn to a review and critique of 
debates between Positivism and Postmodernism in 
contemporary Planning Theory and Practice so as to 
demonstrate the truth (truth and fact are indeed dif-
ferent things…) that (r)evolution at the level of axi-
oms and associated logics—in the context of our study, 
those concerning order in manifestation and the po-
tential for epistemological truth—from which we plan 
society must occur before we have the potential for 
planning truly (r)evolutionary modes of social and 
academic practice.  
Ouspensky on Psychology 
A brief overview of contemporary (Modernist) psy-
chology is necessary before we enter into our core 
discussion. Ouspensky‘s views on the evolution of 
human psychology and the history of psychology are 
worth taking a moment to expound upon as they set 
the stage for our analysis of contemporary academic 
conceptions of the relationship between theory and 
practice (mind and matter) and their implications for 
Planning Theory and Practice. Ouspensky argues:  
―…practically never in history has psychology 
stood at so low a level as at the present time [the first 
half of the 20th century]. It has lost all touch with its 
origin and its meaning … And this is so in spite of the 
fact that never in history have there been so many 
psychological theories and so many psychological 
writings. [(This problem has been compounded by the 
rise of neuroscience in the late 20
th
 and early 21
st
  
century…)],‖ (Ouspensky, 1951, p.6). 
Ouspensky notes that while ―Psychology is some-
times called a new science … this is quite wrong,‖ 
(Ouspensky, 1945, p.4). Indeed, 
―Psychology is, perhaps, the oldest science, and, 
unfortunately, in its most essential features a forgotten 
science. For thousands of years psychology existed 
under the name of philosophy. In India all forms of 
Yoga, which are essentially psychology, are described 
as one of the six systems of philosophy. Sufi teachings, 
which again are chiefly psychological, are regarded as 
partly religious and partly metaphysical. In Europe, 
even quite recently in the last decades of the 19th cen-
tury, many works on psychology were referred to as 
philosophy. And in spite of the fact that almost all 
sub-divisions of philosophy such as logic, the theory 
of cognition, ethics, aesthetics, referred to the work of 
the human mind or senses, psychology was regarded 
as inferior to philosophy and as relating only to the 
lower or more trivial sides of human nature…. 
Parallel with its existence under the name of phi-
losophy, psychology existed even longer connected 
with one or another religion … There are many excel-
lent works on psychology in quite orthodox religious 
literature of different countries and epochs. For in-
stance, in early Christianity there was a collection 
of books of different authors under the general name 
of Philokalia, used in our time in the Eastern Church, 
especially for the instruction of monks. 
During the time when psychology was connected 
with philosophy and religion it also existed in the 
form of Art, Poetry, Drama, Sculpture, Dancing, even 
Architecture, [which] were means for transmitting 
psychological knowledge. For instance, the Gothic 
Cathedrals were in their chief meaning works on  
psychology. 
 In the ancient times before philosophy, religion 
and art had taken their separate forms as we now 
know them, psychology had existed in the form of 
Mysteries, such as those of Egypt and of ancient 
Greece. Later, after the disappearance of the Mysteries, 
psychology existed in the form of Symbolical Teach-
ings which were sometimes connected with the reli-
gion of the period and sometimes not connected, such 
as Astrology, Alchemy, Magic, and the more modern: 
Masonry, Occultism and Theosophy,‖ (Ouspensky, 
1945, p.4). 
Continuing on to the relationship between evolution 
and psychology, Ouspensky divides the study of psy-
chology into two camps:  
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―First: systems which study man as they find him, 
or such as they suppose or imagine him to be [as a 
seed in of itself]. Modern ‗scientific‘ psychology or 
what is known under that name belongs to this cate-
gory. Second: systems which study man not from the 
point of view of what he is, or what he seems 
to be, but from the point of view of what he may be-
come; that is, from the point of view of his possible 
evolution [as the seed in of its potential to grow into a 
tree]. 
These last systems are in reality the original ones, 
or in any case the oldest, and only they can explain the 
forgotten origin and the meaning of psychology.  
When we understand the importance of the study of 
man from the point of view of his possible evolution, 
we shall understand that the first answer to the questi-
on: What is psychology? —should be that psychology 
is the study of the principles, laws and facts of [hu-
manity‘s] possible evolution,‖(Ouspensky, 1951, p. 6). 
As we know a seed in its potential for evolution in-
to a tree rather than as a seed in and of itself, so too 
shall we know humanity.1 For Ouspensky — in a 
similar vein as authors like De Chardin below — it is 
psychology (soul-mind) rather than biology (body) 
that forms the central object of human evolution. 
Changes in our state of mind brought on by the energy 
of ideas — rather than changes in our biological 
makeup or the physical environment it inhabits — act 
as the evolutionary catalyst for conscious, potentially 
rational beings.  
 Regarding normative Evolutionary Theory in 
Modernity, Ouspensky notes: 
―As regards ordinary modern views on the origin of 
[humanity] and [it‘s] previous evolution I must say at 
once that they cannot be accepted….  
We must deny any possibility of future mechanical 
evolution of [humanity]; that is, evolution happen-
ing by itself according to laws of heredity and select-
ion, and without man's conscious efforts and understa-
nding of his possible evolution,‖ (Ouspensky, 1951, p.6). 
In short, humanity represents the entrance into what 
thinkers like De Chardin labeled ‗the Noosphere‘ (a 
new stage of evolution beyond the two previous stages 
of evolution that we know as the Geo- and 
                                                        
1 ―Though originally devised by Maurice Nicoll in the 1950s, Jacob 
Needleman popularized this metaphor of humans as seeds in his book 
Lost Christianity and named it acornology‖. We are reprinting the story 
from: (Bourgeault, C 2009) 
Bio-spheres). As such, we cannot model the future of 
evolution based on the past (as we cannot model hy-
drodynamics based on the study of solid matter) (De 
Chardin, 1965; Levit, 2000). Such moments, where 
the inability to model the future based on the past as a 
function of changes in the dimensional quality of the 
object of study, have been labeled ‗singularities‘ in 
contemporary social movements like the Transhu-
manism (Barnesmoore, 2016b). In more traditional 
regimes of thought these moments were known as 
‗The Apocalypse‘.  
Noospheric beings are dimensionally incommen-
surable2 with Biospheric beings as Biospheric beings 
are dimensionally incommensurable with the Geo-
spheric beings, and so we must understand that evolu-
tion will take on new dimensional qualities as it did in 
the shift from Geo- to Bio-sphere (these changes in 
dimensional quality are akin to state changes in mat-
ter). Evolution in the Geosphere can be understood as 
planar (2D) as it evolves in a relatively closed, stable 
cycle. Evolution in the Biosphere can be seen as a 
solid (3D) in that it evolves in a spiral (i.e., it changes 
through cycles). The Noosphere, then (accepting the 
hermetic dictum ‗as above so below‘), ought to take 
on a temporal (4D) quality (or, more aptly, a relation 
to ‗the mastery of time‘).3  
What does this mean? While biology evolves over 
many scales, from short-term responses to dramatic 
changes of environment to long-term evolutionary 
trends like the development of the spinal cord or the 
transition from single to multi-celled organisms over 
hundreds of thousands, millions and even billions of 
years, consciousness evolves in a moment (however 
long that moment takes to come about) — the flash of 
lightning — and in so doing transcends temporal con-
straints.  
On a different note, as evolution is stripped of its 
reflexive articulation by passing time, evolution is no 
                                                        
2 We derive our use of the term ‗dimensional incommensurability‘ 
from P. D. Ouspensky‘s Tertium Organum. In short, dimensional in-
commensurability can be explained in the relationship between two and 
three dimensional objects; while you may be able to sketch a three 
dimensional object onto a two dimensional plane, the mass of the three 
dimensional object is dimensionally incommensurable with the dimen-
sional quality of two dimensional reality and thus cannot ‗manifest‘ 
into the two dimensional ‗reflection‘ of the three dimensional object. 
For a more thorough metaphor also see the ‗Flat World‘ thought ex-
periment.  
3  ‗Mastery of time‘ is conceived here in terms of ration-
al-epistemological transcendence of temporally reductive modes of 
thought (i.e. peripatetic reductionism) and associated modes of behav-
ior/ conceptions of being.  
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longer assured and devolution becomes possible.  
―Our fundamental idea shall be that [humanity] as 
we know [it] is not a completed being; that nature de-
velops [humanity] only up to a certain point4 and then 
leaves [it], either to develop further, by its own efforts 
and devices, or to live and die such as [it] was born, or 
to degenerate and lose capacity for development.  
Evolution of [humanity] in this case will mean the 
development of certain inner qualities and features 
which usually remain undeveloped, and cannot de-
velop by themselves,” (Ouspensky, 1951, p.7). 
Social Evolution (i.e., Social Development), then, 
must be understood as a process that is catalyzed by 
the energy of ideas-theories. The history of Social 
Evolution cannot, in this lens, be understood as a re-
flexive response to the natural environment (or worse, 
and more ironically, as a response to the labor re-
quirements of a given mode of production stripped 
from its foundation in ideas-theories…). Instead, we 
must understand the history of Social Evolution as one 
in which practical responses to changes in environ-
mental contexts are mediated by a given society‘s 
‗theory‘ (the essence of its ideas, logics and axioms or 
‗world view‘) and where modes of production (and all 
such systems of practice) are developed contingently 
in relation to (as ontologically dependent upon) a so-
ciety‘s ‗theories‘. Our capacity to conceive of systems 
of practice (be they environmental, social, spiritual, 
etc.) has always been contingent upon the ‗theo-
ries‘ by which we assign meaning to the world. As 
such, counter-hegemonic or revolutionary change 
must be rooted in a (r)evolution of ‗world view‘ (the 
essence of our society‘s ideas, logics and axioms).  
Hegemony in Modernity 
As this article interrogates the role of ideas, axioms 
and logics (‗world view‘) in revolution against hege-
monic regimes, we take a moment for a short inquiry 
into our use of the term hegemony. Though the work 
of Italian social philosopher, Antonio Gramsci (1971) 
popularized the term in western academic literature, 
our understanding of hegemony is derived first and 
foremost from the work of British Social Theorist  
Stuart Hall (1988). Hall (1988) eschews definite, stat-
                                                        
4 Here we see the fundamental conception of the Order of Nature, 
as womb, in the Matriarchal, Goddess Oriented traditions that spanned 
much of the globe before the rise of the patriarchal, paternalist tradi-
tion of light… 
ic-definitional conceptions of hegemony for concep-
tions of hegemony as a dynamic process that in-
cludes breaches and techniques (in the Foucaultian 
sense of techniques of power) for sealing said breach-
es. Our understanding of hegemony as process 
has been influenced by debates on the nature of ne-
oliberalism waged between authors like Jamie Peck 
and Aihwa Ong. In short, Peck‘s (2010; 2016; Brenner 
et al., 2010) camp (also moving from inspiration by 
Stuart Hall) argues that conjunctural analysis of ne-
oliberalism‘s contingent, contextual manifesta-
tions begins to bring an image of neoliberal hegemony 
into focus. Ong‘s (2007; Ong et al., 2008) camp ar-
gues that the contingent, contextual manifestation of 
neoliberalism belies classification as a hegemonic 
project. We conceive of hegemony (Barnesmoore & 
Wyly, 2016 [In Press]) — in a move more coherent 
with Peck‘s camp — as a process where the essence 
(ideas, axioms and logics) of a hegemonic regime 
manifests in a contingent, contextual relationship with 
the environment (cultural, historical, physical, etc.) of 
manifestation. Revolution against a hegemonic regime, 
then, must be conceived of in terms of revolution 
against hegemonic essence (against the ideas, axioms 
and logics that form the essence of a hegemonic re-
gime‘s many contextually contingent manifestations) 
rather than in terms of practices that rise from the 
hegemonic essence of the hegemonic regime revolu-
tionaries purport to fight. 
The term ‗dialectical hegemony‘ elucidates the dan-
gers posed by ‗revolution‘ against a hegemonic regime 
via practices derived from (rationalized by) the hege-
monic essence of said hegemonic regime. Dialectical 
hegemony refers to a mode of social control wherein 
two (or more) ‗sides‘ of a conflict are created and 
controlled so that the conflict can be directed to prod-
uce a desired outcome. We argue dialectical hegemony 
is facilitated by ‗creating‘ (or simply empowering and 
appropriating) seemingly oppositional-autonomous 
groups whose thoughts, behaviors and conceptions 
of being rise from the same hegemonic essence (from 
the same ideas, axioms and logics); this technique of 
power ensures that the outcome of the staged conflict 
necessarily includes the hegemonic essence (which is 
rendered banally invisible or commonsensical by 
ubiquity through the conflict between the seemingly 
autonomous actors). In normative US military and 
political practice this strategy was derived from Carl 
von Clausewitz work on dialectical military strategies 
and Sun Zi‘s The Art of War (Burnet, 2016).  
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Philip Abrams (1988) theorized the state as ‗a ma-
sk‘ for elite power. The State is seen as effective in 
achieving the interests of the elite class precisely be-
cause it seems to be autonomous from the elite class. 
We (Barnesmoore & Wyly, 2016 [In Press]) have sub-
sequently theorized the news media, when conceived 
as a seemingly autonomous ‗fourth branch of gov-
ernment‘, as a second mask for elite power. The news 
media, in its seeming autonomy from the state and 
from the elite class, is able to reinforce the basic ideas, 
axioms and logics (hegemonic essence) by which the 
elite class epistemologically subjugates the general 
public from a seemingly autonomous perspective. 
From this point of departure we can see regimes of 
thought or practice that purport autonomy from the 
hegemonic core of a society while rising from the 
hegemonic essence of said society as masks for elite 
power. 
Planning: Theory and Practice  
Hegemonic Essences in Modernity  
Planning Theory and Practice provide an interesting 
and elucidating perspective into the influence of Mod-
ernist axioms and associated logics (of the Modernist 
‗world view‘ or hegemonic essence)—especially con-
cerning the ‗production‘ of order in manifestation— 
upon Modernist social systems. Martin Krieger pro-
poses a move away from Catholic Formalism of 
Modernist Planning Theory and Practice towards a 
more Talmudic Planning Theory and Practice wherein 
planners are ―continually fixing their plans so that 
they fit the vagaries of situation and event [(of con-
text)] without giving up their commitments to order 
and wholeness and goodness‖ and, in so doing, eluci-
dates the role of the role of ‗world view‘ (in this case 
ideas, axioms and logics concerning the nature of or-
der) in Planning Theory and Practice (Krieger, 1995, 
p.217). Krieger conceives of Planning Theory and 
Practice within a Talmudic ontology that accepts the 
difference, change, imperfection, contingency, etc. of 
manifestation‘s implicit dimensional quality as negat-
ing the potential for static, unitary Truth and Order 
therein without denying the reality of Infinite Sub-
stance and its Emanations as well as their ability to 
provide an objective standard for Truth and Order in 
manifestation. Krieger, then, is proposing a model of 
planning in which the dimensional incommensurabil-
ity of the uncreated (Infinite Substance and its Emana-
tions) and the created-manifest is accounted for with-
out stripping one or the other of their essential dimen-
sional quality (as was done by Positivism, which at-
tempted to strip manifestation of its order of differ-
ence through domination of difference to create uni-
tary Truth in manifestation, and Postmodernism, 
which attempted to strip reality of Truth (Infinite Sub-
stance and its Emanations) through axiomatic relega-
tion of Truth to the sphere of unreality, irrationality, 
‗madness‘, etc.5). In more practical terms, the dimen-
sional incommensurability of ideas (soul-mind) and 
matter is accepted and we allow our ideals—rather 
than fixed articulations of those ideals as practice—to 
guide our steps through the many contexts of the ma-
terial world.  
In another important note Krieger argues that ‗the 
scientific‘ and ‗the spiritual‘ cannot be aptly differen-
tiated as is evident in the ―serious and self-conscious‖ 
mysticism of the Pythagoreans and in the works of 
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Durkheim (Krieger, 
1995, p. 218). Krieger, then, is proposing a return to a 
conceptualization of rationalism and relations between 
ideas, axioms and logics (soul-mind) and material 
context (between environment and psychology) that is 
sympathetic with the model expounded by 
Barnesmoore (2016a, p.83). In summary, Krieger‘s 
article makes an attempt at providing a new set of ax-
ioms and associated logics (a new ‗world view‘ or 
hegemonic essence) in which we can conceive of 
Planning Practice; this is the kind of theory that can 
expand potentials for conceptualization of practices 
that are counter-hegemonic and, or revolutionary.  
Modernist Planning: Positivism & Postmodernism 
To provide ideational context for our discussion we 
provide a theoretical overview of the contemporary 
history of Planning Theory and Practice (and Social 
Science Theory and Practice more generally) by theo-
rizingthe relationship between Positivism and Post 
Modernism. We conceptualize the relationship be-
tween Positivism and Post Modernism as a process of 
transformation from a system (Positivism) that at-
                                                        
5 Postmodernism, in short, presumes that all metaphysical realities 
are simply opiates of the masses by reducing all viewpoints that trans-
cend dogmatic materialism to the perversion of paternalist religion.  
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tempts to impute the Order of Truth to manifestation  
through dominating difference to a system (Postmod-
ernism) that attempts to combat the Positivist imposi-
tion of Truth (the order of Infinite Substance) upon the 
world of fact (manifestation, which in its motion, 
change, difference, etc. is dimensionally incommen-
surable with the unitary dimensional quality of Infinite 
Substance) by accepting the Positivist reduction of 
reality to passing time and physical space (i.e., to the 
‗world view‘ of Newtonian Physics) and extending 
this conception of reality to the logical theoretical 
conclusion that there is no Truth. Rather than illus-
trating the perversity of the Positivist attempt to im-
pute the Order of Truth (Infinite Substance) to mani-
festation through domination of difference by reviving 
sensitivity to the reality and epistemological role of 
the Infinite Substance and its Emanations — which is 
to say problematization of the Modernist reduction of 
reality to passing time and physical space and of the 
foundation of reason to fact — and highlighting the 
dimensional incommensurability of Infinite Substance 
and its Emanations‘ (i.e., of infinite-unity) with the 
change, motion, difference, etc. (the multiplicity) of 
finite manifestation, Postmodernism instead simply 
accepted the Modernist reduction of reality to passing 
time and physical space and took it to its logical, ni-
hilist conclusion that there is no truth.  
In the framework of this study we can argue that 
Postmodernism accepted the hegemonic essence of 
Modernity that undergirds Positivism. In so doing, and 
in symptoms of Postmodernism like obfuscating aver-
sion to any form of generalization (clearly manifest in 
Aihwa Ong‘s visceral6 aversion to the term hegemony) 
and discernment (clearly manifest in the (anti)critique 
(Noys, 2014) of Bruno Latour), Postmodernism can be 
seen as attempting to axiomatically dominate unity out 
of difference and can thus be understood as a coun-
tervailing force to Positivism that rises from the same 
hegemonic essence as Positivism. In its seemingly 
autonomous identity and articulation by the same 
hegemonic essence as Positivism, Postmodernism 
can be understood as forming a dialectical-hegemonic 
relationship with Positivism that ensures the susten-
tion of Modernism‘s hegemonic essence (in this case 
the reduction of reality to the world of Newtonian 
                                                        
6 We audited Ong‘s graduate anthropology seminar at UC Berkeley 




Positivist ‘High Modernity’ 
James Scott‘s discussion of ‗High Modernist Planning‘ 
illustrates an archetypally Positivist manifestation of 
the Modernist ‗world view‘. Scott defines ‗High 
Modernism‘ as: 
―A strong … version of the beliefs in scientific and 
technological progress that were associated with in-
dustrialization. … At its center was a supreme 
self-confidence about continued linear progress, the 
development of scientific and technical knowledge, 
the expansion of production, the rational design of 
social order, the growing satisfaction of human needs, 
and, not least, an increasing control over nature com-
mensurate with scientific understanding and natural 
laws. 
Society became an object that the state might man-
age and transform with a view towards perfecting it,‖ 
(Scott, 1998, p.89). 
In the ‗High Modernity‘ of positivist planning soci-
ety is to be organized by institutions that are typi-
fied by ―hierarchy, discipline, regimentation, strict 
order, rational planning, [and] a geometric environ-
ment‖ (Scott, 1998, p.195). Other constituents include: 
dogmatic atheism (whose basic axiom is the reduction 
of reality to passing time and physical space); social 
ethics articulated by ―the cult of technology and sci-
ence‖; ―time consciousness, efficient work habits, and 
clock-driven routine‖7 (Scott, 1998, p.195). ―Its or-
ganizers described it in rational symmetrical terms, in 
the mathematical language of planning, control figures, 
statistics, projections and precise commands,‖ (Scott, 
1998, p. 196; Sites, 1989). We argue the practices of 
Positivist High Modernity rise from Modernism‘s re-
duction of reality, meaning, truth, ontological de-
pendence, etc. to the material world of passing time 
and physical space (as well as the nihilism necessitat-
ed therein). As such, Positivist High Modernity can be 
described (in essence) as the attempt to create a uni-
fied order in manifestation through domination of dif-
ference that is rendered possible by axiomatic relega-
tion of Infinite Substance, its Emanations and thus the 
implicit order of manifestation to the sphere of unreal-
ity, unreason and madness and the subsequent neces-
                                                        
7 See Foucault, Discipline and Punish for a discussion of domina-
tion by time in Modernity.  
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sity of creating (rather than actualizing) order derived 
therein.8  
The River 
Dunaway‘s reading of Lorentz‘s The River provides  
a robust empirical example of ‗Positivist High Mo-
dernity‘. Dunaway frames the film (and New Deal 
infrastructure planning regimes in general) as an  
attempt to produce a new norm of socio-political 
engagement with nature by creating an image of   
humanity as unified with nature. Dunaway‘s reading 
of the film and its relationship to the ‗regionalism‘ of 
authors like Louis Mumford works to illustrate the 
potentials of socializing general publics within new 
‗world views‘ in order to create the potential for ac-
ceptance and participation in the conceptualization of 
new systems of social organization (systems of prac-
tice) as well as the implicit shortcomings of Positivist, 
Modernist Paternalism.9 By ―reinforcing the ecologi-
cal idea of the interdependence of humans and na-
ture,‖ Lorentz represents ―the land as an interdepend-
ent system,‖ (Dunaway, 2008, p. 62). In a similar vein, 
the Mississippi Valley Committee submitted a report 
in October of 1934 that ―urged readers to consider all 
resources as interrelated. ‗When one strand in the  
interwoven web… is touched, …every other strand  
vibrates‘‖ (Dunaway 2008, p. 64). ―Lorentz wanted to 
reveal the unity in diversity, the often unrecognized 
connections between different parts of nature…‖     
in order to ―reconcile the practical with the poetic,   
the spiritual with the utilitarian,‖ (Dunaway,     
2008, p.76). 
Louis Mumford describes the new ‗world view‘ in 
which the practices of the New Deal were conceived 
as ―com itted to engaging with the practical realities 
of modern life and ‗reformulating a more vital tissue 
of ideas and symbols,‘‖ (Dunaway, 2008, p.62; Mum-
ford, 1926, p.114). Mumford also argued ―what is 
needed for political life… is not mere factual 
knowledge: for this by itself is inert: what is needed 
are those esthetic and mythic impulses which open up 
new activities and carve out new themes for construc-
tion and contemplation‖ (Dunaway 2008, p. 78; 
Mumford, 1938). Mumford and the New Deal Gov-
ernment, then, were clearly aware of the reality that 
                                                        
8 See Barnesmoore (2016b) for a discussion of the relationship be-
tween the Modernist ‗world view‘ and notions of ‗creating order‘. 
9 Paternalism is the nexus of bio-reductive traditions that conceive 
of human nature as evil and thus of social order in terms of hierarchical 
domination by ‗the father‘.  
new ideas, axioms, logics, etc. are necessary to create 
the potential for public acceptance of and participation 
in new social systems and the practices therein (to 
make it possible for, in a Foucaultian ethos, the public 
to ‗think the that‘ of New Deal Modernism and the 
importance of its environmental infrastructure pro-
jects).  
While there is some wisdom to be gleaned from 
Lorentz and Mumford‘s attempt to create a new ‗world 
view‘ in which humans and nature are unified and in 
their sensitivity to the role of ideas in producing a new 
social order, the conception of unified order implicit in 
The River is distinctly Modernist-Paternalist (and thus 
negates the potential for producing the harmonic order 
in human relations with nature it purports to foster).10 
In The River, the flooding of the Mississippi was con-
ceived of as nature’s revenge (as the revenge of the fe-
minine, chaotic other).11 As such, unity with nature 
comes in imputing order to nature that is suitable for 
human interests via modes of technological domination. 
Given the Abrahamic-Paternalist ‗world view‘ that 
was secularized to form the Modernist ‗world view‘ 
(Barnesmoore, 2016a; Barnesmoore, 2016b)—a 
‗world view‘ in which God created the earth and all 
living things therein with the purpose of being domi-
nated by Man—the best interest of nature is conceived 
in terms of subservience to human interests. Given the 
Modernist reduction of reality to passing time and 
physical space and the necessity of creating order de-
rived therein (Barnesmoore 2016b), unity with nature 
is conceived in terms of building Dams, Levees, 
Commercial Farms, etc. (i.e., in building technological 
apparatuses for dominating the forces of nature). In 
more general terms, by striping reality of its eternal 
dimensions—the dimensions of reality from which 
nature derives its actual, eternal order (i.e., Infinite 
Substance and its Emanations)—Modernism strips 
nature of its implicit order and thus views it as a cha-
otic, feminine other (as difference) to be brought into 
order through technological domination (Barnesmoore, 
2016a; Barnesmoore, 2016b) — ―the sublime power 
of the New Deal controlling the unruly forces of na-
ture,‖ (Dunaway, 2008, p.62). Order in nature is not 
                                                        
10 See Meng Zi‘s 2A2 for an illustrative demonstration of Modern-
ist-Paternalism‘s negation of the potential for producing harmonic 
order with nature.  
11 As the wrathful feminine other of the archetypal paternalist im-
agination. 
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to be created through domination.12 
Unity for Whom? 
Unsurprisingly (given its American cultural con-
text…), The River does a very poor job of addressing 
racial politics in its attempt to construct an image of 
unified order (Dunaway 2008, p.82). This racism  
provides a useful lens for understanding the social 
implications of Modernist-Paternalist notions of  
unified order as something to be created through the 
domination of difference. Rather than grappling with 
the deep racial, gender, class, etc. divisions that have 
plagued the US from inception, Lorentz attempted to 
gloss over these issues (to dominate difference) by 
focusing on the unity of the white nation and its po-
tential for ‗harmony‘ with nature (by creating an im-
age of unity in the US public through dominating ra-
cial difference) in only showing images of white folks. 
In short, the Modernist-Paternalist reduction of reality 
to passing time and physical space and subsequent 
conception of order as something to be created though 
hierarchical domination of difference (Barnesmoore, 
2016b; Foucault, 1970) lead Lorentz to create an im-
age of unity (to create order) through reduction of the 
actual diversity (difference) in the US to the ‗unitary 
order‘ of White, Christian Nationalism. 
Postmodern Modernism 
Love and Planning in ‘Postmodernity’ 
Porter‘s special issue ―What‘s Love Got To Do With It? 
Illuminations on Loving Attachment in Planning‖ in 
Planning Theory and Practice provides an example of 
an admittedly well-intentioned postmodern attempt to 
critique Positivism that fails to escape the ideas, axi-
oms and logics (‗world view‘, hegemonic essence) of 
Modernism and thus reinforces Modernist Hegemony. 
Porter et al. valiantly attempt to revive sensitivity to 
love in Planning Theory and Practice, but not without 
the chagrin of Modernists (mostly positivists) who 
have, by and large, relegated all forms of intuitive and 
emotive knowledge to the sphere of unreality, irra-
tionality and madness. Karen Umemoto argues 
―Attachment involving human emotion is often 
seen as ‗problematic‘ by many in academia who frown 
upon emotional bonding between a researcher and 
                                                        
12 See Barnesmoore (2016a) and Zhuang Zi‘s story of the bell stand 
maker therein for a view of order in nature as implicit and the human 
role in actualizing that implicit order. 
‗subjects‘ of research, assuming that it bars our ability 
to seek an ‗objective‘ understanding of phenomena. 
Loving attachment involving our social identity is 
especially seen to have a corrosive effect on critical 
analysis, as it is assumed we can ‗go native‘ and lose 
the ability to speak from an ‗unbiased‖ perspective….‘ 
We in fact can substantially enrich our understanding 
of planning by taking advantage of the unique insights 
that loving attachment to people and places of our 
research can yield, knowing there are moral and per-
spectival challenges to address,‖ (Porter et al., 2012, 
p.595). 
Loving attachment is useful for planning, if we may 
paraphrase Umemoto‘s argument, in its capacity to 
unify us with (render us as intimate with) people and 
places, and thus to, in so doing, intuitively feel their 
truth and manifest ―the love in which high intuition 
supplements knowledge, and arouses [one‘s] own 
fullest intensity of expression, to call forth the la-
tent but not less vital possibilities [at hand],‖ (Geddes, 
1915, p. 397)—―our empathic attachment to people 
and places may inform our multiple senses and give us 
a better ‗feel‘ not only for what thoughts might be 
traveling through the minds of people but also what 
they may feel in their guts,‖ (Porter et al., 2012, p. 
598). Put in more traditional philosophical terms, lov-
ing attachment allows individuals to bring emotions 
(passions) enlivened by rational intuition to bear in 
development of Planning Theory and Practice. Lisa 
Bates and Marisa Zapata make an argument similar to 
Umemoto‘s concerning the usefulness of love in plan-
ning. ―Loving attachment to our racial/ethnic heritage 
communities aims to produce knowledge that is 
emancipatory for communities and transformative for 
planning practice. Love energizes our work,‖ (Porter 
et al., 2012, p.599).  
Umemoto, Bates and Zapata are right in pointing to 
the epistemological importance of love for Planning 
Theory and Practice, but the postmodern understand-
ing of emotive-intuitive knowledge (of feelings and 
intuition) as nothing more than subjective belief (i.e., 
in terms that ignore their potential connection with the 
uncreated) negates the potential for counter-heg-
emonic or revolutionary outcomes in regards to Mo-
dernity as a whole. While Umemoto‘s observations 
concerning positivist relegation of love and other 
emotions to the sphere of irrationality in of their ‗sub-
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jective bias‘ and the subsequent evisceration of intui-
tive-emotive forms of knowledge from the sphere of 
truth are elucidating (Porter et al., 2012) correct and 
indeed revolutionary, her response of attempting to 
legitimate ‗the subjective‘ within the nihilism of the 
Modernist world view (i.e., in a model that accepts 
feelings and intuition as opposed to objectivity) rather 
than arguing that the feelings and intuition of the sub-
ject (when enlivened by a subject that is resonant with 
the uncreated) are an elevated mode of knowing that 
gives us a perspective on Truth that is (as we see be-
low) inaccessible through the materially rational (per-
ipatetic) mind is counter-revolutionary and allows her 
argument to fall into a dialectical-hegemonic rela-
tionship with Positivist-Modernity .  
Returning to our central argument, before we can 
aptly rationalize necessary social changes like the in-
tegration of intuition and emotions like love into plan-
ning theory and practice, we must first transcend the 
Modernist hegemonic essence lest our rationalizations 
for the use of love and intuition in planning (like Um-
emoto‘s above) reinforce the ‗world view‘ that pro-
duced the hegemonic regime we purport to challenge. 
Umemoto‘s rationalization can be understood as akin 
to attempts at removing ‗weeds‘ from the garden by 
only pulling out the stalk (‗practical‘) part of the plant 
and leaving the root (‗world view‘) behind; if the root 
(ideas, axioms and logics, hegemonic essence, ‗world 
view‘) remains, a new, seemingly autonomous, stalk 
will grow from the old root. In other words, if we only 
pull the stalk of positivism and leave its root (its 
hegemonic essence of ideas, logics and assumptions) 
to form the foundation of critiques like postmodern-
ism we will continue to produce seemingly autono-
mous stalks that actually reinforce the root of the 
problem that is Modernity. There is no coun-
ter-hegemonic or revolutionary potential if our chal-
lenges to ‘the system’ rise from the same hegemonic 
essence as ‘the system’. 
Intellectual Love and Planning  
―Possibly, in our intuitive perceptions, which may be 
truer than our science and less impeded by words than 
our philosophies, we realize the indivisibility of the 
earth — its soil, mountains, rivers, forests, climate, 
plants, and animals, and respect it collectively not on-
ly as a useful servant but as a living being, vastly less 
alive than ourselves in degree, but vastly greater than 
ourselves in time and space — a being that was old 
when the morning stars sang together, and when the 
last of us has been gathered unto his fathers, will 
still be young, ‖(Leopold, 1949, p.95).  
 
-Aldo Leopold 
The above attempts to rationalize the value of love 
and other emotions in Planning Theory and Practice 
— in revitalizing the importance and meaning of sub-
jective difference through denying Truth altogether 
rather than reasserting the connection between rational 
intuition, emotion and Truth — simply accept the 
Modernist hegemonic essence (its reduction of reality 
to passing time and physical space, its reduction of 
humanity to discrete, biological individuals, its reduc-
tion of mind to matter therein and its reduction of the 
potentials for social order to hierarchical domination 
therein) like other Postmodern ‗(anti)Critiques‘ (Noys, 
2014). Postmodern (anti)Critiques are incommensura-
ble with the potential for counter-hegemonic or revo-
lutionary outcomes against Modernism and indeed 
have further compounded the hegemonic dominance 
of Modernism by sealing the breach in hegemony 
caused by the fall of Positivism from a seemingly au-
tonomous perspective that rises from the same Mod-
ernist hegemonic essence as Positivism. Rather than 
accepting the implicit nihilism of the Modernist 
‗World View‘, we must argue for the importance of 
love and other emotions in Planning Theory and Prac-
tice from a ‗world view‘ that recalls the relation-
ship between rational intuition, emotion and Truth. 
The true value of rationally enlivened love and oth-
er emotions (of the rational intuition) as an epistemo-
logical foundation for Planning Theory and Practice 
comes in allowing humans to (at least to some degree) 
transcend subjective limitations. This true value of 
rational intuition can only be known when we escape 
the hegemonic essence (ideas, axioms and logics) of 
Modernity and remember the Infinite Substance and 
its Emanations, their role as the eternal foundation for 
Truth (i.e., the true foundation of objectivity), the na-
ture of humanity in relationship to infinite substance 
(which transcends the discrete, biological conception 
of humanity that undergirds Modernity) and the true 
relationship between ‗mind‘ (consciousness) and mat-
ter therein. In intellectual love, and in rationally en-
livened, emotive modes of being and knowing more 
generally, our intimacy with Infinite Substance and its 
Emanations allows us to feel the Truth of a situation 
(in more precise terms feel the sympathy of manifes-
tation with the Truth it reflects in motion) in a manner 
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that transcends the sensory limitations of material ra-
tionality (of the peripatetic mind).13 In short, when 
viewed from a perspective outside the Modernist 
‗world view‘ (hegemonic essence), the value of love 
and other emotions (when rationally enlivened by in-
timacy with the Infinite Substance) comes in trans-
cending rather than simply validating the ephemeral 
reality of the subjective…14 The value of love and 
other emotions cannot be restricted to the undeniably 
important problematization Positivist conceptions of 
Truth and denial-domination of subjective realities 
therein if we wish to revolt against Modernity.  
Rational Intuition is valuable for Planning Theory 
and Practice because it is more true, more real, more 
objective, etc. than the ‗objective‘ factual knowledge 
of positivism and the peripatetic mind (the mind of 
motion, linearity, factual accumulation, etc., which is 
to say ‗the maelstrom‘ of classical mythology). Valor-
ization of intuition as ‗subjective‘ obfuscates the po-
tential Truth of rational intuition (which derives its 
Truth in trending towards a-subjective sympathy with 
the uncreated…) and thus relegates intuition and other 
forms of emotive knowledge to the nihilism of Mo-
dernity. To aptly argue for the importance of loving- 
rational intuition in Planning Theory and Practice, 
then, we must develop (remember…) a ‗world view‘ 
in which Infinite Substance and its Emanations are 
real and in which intuition and other modes of emo-
tive knowledge have the potential for Truth when en-
livened by intimacy with the resonance of Infinite 
Substance and its Emanations, which is to say the 
‗simplest and most universal things‘ of Descartes Ra-
tionalism. We must remember an epistemological 
framework in which Truth is assigned to rational intu-
ition rather than following Umemoto in arguing for 
the importance of emotive-intuitive epistemology 
within the nihilistic hegemonic essence of Modernism 
where the emotive-intuitive node of our mind is re-
duced to subjective ‗belief‘. We must grow our episte-
                                                        
13 Again, Foucault‘s discourse on knowledge as resemblance in The 
Order of Things and the Daoist term ‗Wu Wei‘ are illustrative. 
14 We should note that this is not a call for simply dismissing the 
importance of the subjective as understood by Porter et. al. People‘s 
individual perspective on the truth is, if nothing else, very real for them, 
and therefore has a distinct effect on the ways in which individuals 
experience the world; as such, simply ignoring the subjective is a sure 
route to cruelty. See the final battle (where Galbatorix is defeated by 
remorse brought on by the memory of the world seen through the sub-
jective lens of a small and to Galbatorix‘s mind, insignificant bird) in 
the Christopher Paolini‘s Inheritance Cycle for an imagistic representa-
tion of the role of ignoring subjective truth in the production of cruelty.  
mology from a new root of ideas, axioms and logics 
and thus consciously evolve beyond the social woes of 
Modernity.  
To put this argument in different terms, on the one 
hand the Modernist ‗world view‘ precludes the poten-
tial for Eternal Truth (through relegating the eternal 
dimensions of reality to the sphere of unreality), and 
on the other hand the value of intuition, love and other 
emotions for planning lies precisely in their relation-
ship to Eternal Truth (in facilitating our capacity to 
harmonize Truth with fact, form with manifestation, 
the infinite with the finite, etc.). As such, we cannot 
aptly argue for the importance of intuition, love and 
other emotions in planning practice from the perspec-
tive of the Modernist ‗world view‘ (which requires 
that we reduce loving intuition-emotion to the nihilist, 
matter before mind hegemonic essence of Modernism 
and thus to a subjective belief whose cause and being 
are presumed to be contained within matter).  
Practice-Theory Dogma 
Beyond reduction of love and other emotions to sub-
jective belief, the Postmodern acceptance of the Mod-
ernist hegemonic essence leads to conceptions of love 
(like all phenomena…) in terms of practice; rather 
than a state of being, an aeonian form or an energy 
with its own self-subsistent reality, love is reduced to 
the practices by which it manifests (i.e., the reduction 
of the force and form of attraction to the actual prac-
tice of atoms bonding). For example, Michelle Kondo 
(following bell hooks) presents a vision of love as 
‗ethical praxis‘ in planning. In this vision, love is ren-
dered as ethical practice (as ―a value and way of be-
ing‖) through three tenets: ―(1) love is without fear, (2) 
living by a love ethic requires the cultivation of 
awareness, and ability to critically examine one‘s ac-
tions, and (3) love is a process rather than an ideal 
state.‖ (Porter et al., 2012, p.603). In each tenet (and 
in viewing love as a value and way of being), love is 
understood as practice (i.e., mind is reduced to matter 
and emotional phenomena like love are stripped of 
their truth ‗beyond‘ the linear temporal dimensional 
quality of manifestation in passing time and physical 
space…). While one dimension of love is surely be-
coming in manifestation, its most essential dimension 
lies in being (in its ‗ideal state‘ that is reflected into 
motion to form the facts of the process by which 
love becomes manifest). Love in (post)Modernity is 
no longer a mode of being in Truth (which is to say 
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that love is no longer intimacy with the Infinite Sub-
stance and its Emanations and subsequent transcend-
ence of illusions concerning the absolute nature of 
discrete, biological, individual being we experience 
through our fourth dimensional senses) or a self-subs-
istent force; instead, love has been reduced to its man-
ifestation (to its expression in practice) and thus 
stripped of the eternal, idyllic dimensional quality that 
allows it to from an epistemological lens into Truth.15  
Annalise Fonza similarly argues that our under-
standing of love and attachment must rise through 
historical progression of ―the nitty-gritty,‖ (Porter et 
al., 2012, p.614). Again love and emotive forms of 
knowledge are reduced to the materialist terms neces-
sitated by the hegemonic essence of Modernity. In 
reality reduced to passing time and physical space 
love must rise as a function of the historical develop-
ment of intersubjective meaning — as nothing is thus 
thought to exist beyond history, all causes must there-
fore lie within history. This argument, however, is be-
lied by the reality that (as Nietzsche so aptly noted) 
―only that which has no history is definable‖ because 
static Truth that is therefore amenable to static defini-
tion is necessarily without motion-time or, thus, ‗his-
tory‘ (Nietzsche 2009, 516). While difference is 
‗saved‘ from the violent domination of difference im-
plicit in the Fascist-Positivist-Modernist Project (we 
agree with Fonza that theory, ideology and unity have 
surely been weaponized by white, paternalist interests), 
the Eternal Truth that underlies reality (Infinite Sub-
stance and its Emanations) remains lost and the nec-
essary nihilism of Modernism is reified in being ren-
dered banally invisible by conflict between seemingly 
autonomous ‗camps‘ and the dialectical-hegemonic 
processes unleashed therein…  
Conclusions 
Art and Intuition in Planning  
Sir Patrick Geddes (1915) expounds a theory of Love 
and Intuition in Planning that transcends the positivist- 
fascist attempt to impose form (of practice, be it polit-
ical, agricultural, environmental, etc.) upon environ-
ment without regard for context and rationalizes the 
importance of love and intuition for Planning without 
                                                        
15 This movement can be understood as equivalent to reducing 
‗force‘ (a relatively ‗eternal‘ dimension of manifestation) to its expres-
sion in an individual‘s motions (a rather ephemeral dimension of mani-
festation…).  
accepting the Modernist Hegemonic Essence and thus 
reducing love and intuition to purely bio-subjective 
phenomenon: 
―Each valid scheme should and must embody the 
full utilization of its local and regional conditions, 
and be the expression of local and of regional person-
ality. ‗Local character‘ is thus no mere accidental 
old-world quaintness, as its mimics think and say. It is 
attained only in course of adequate grasp and treat-
ment of the whole environment, and in active sympa-
thy with the essential and characteristic life of the 
place concerned. Each place has a true personality 
[(an essence)]; and with this shows some unique ele-
ments — a personality too much asleep it may be, but 
which it is the task of the planner, as master-artist, to 
awaken. And only he can do this who is in love and at 
home with his subject — truly in love and fully at 
home — the love in which high intuition supplements 
knowledge, and arouses his own fullest intensity of 
expression, to call forth the latent but not less vital 
possibilities before him,‖ (Geddes, 1915, p.396). 
Manifestation is (in the words of a dear friend) ‗a 
dance between the finite and the infinite‘, between 
creation and the uncreated, and it is only in the silence 
of loving intuition that we may come to know this 
dance from the perspective of its ‗eternal root‘ (Infi-
nite Substance and its Emanations). It is only in loving 
intimacy with environment that we can see resem-
blance as convenience, as it is only in loving intimacy 
with the uncreated that we can see resemblance as 
emulation, and it is only through intuition (made pos-
sible by the rational analogies drawn between con-
venience and emulation) that we can come into sym-
pathy with (to feel) the eternal truth of manifestation 
in a single, silent movement of the mind (Foucault, 
1970). In short, instead of attempting to create an im-
age of unity through dominating difference or reduc-
ing reality to multiplicity and denying essentialism 
altogether, we must instead remember (and thus cata-
lyze actualization of our latent potential for intimacy 
with) the Infinite Substance and its Emanations so that 
we may feel the eternal truth of manifestation and thus 
‗plan a society‘ (and our practices therein) that works 
to optimizes the sympathy of manifestation with the 
uncreated Truth it reflects.  
Geddes also makes the important note that modern-
ist science is ―too static and analytic to come in touch 
with art‖ and that the artist ―sees that … artistic vir-
tues lay in expression of the vital emotions, ideals, and 
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ideas of [the] day‖; the artist‘s ―task [is] to express 
the best of his own age,‖ (Geddes, 1915, p.398). We 
argue that the incommensurability of ‗Modernist Sci-
ence‘ (e.g., Social Science) with art comes precisely in 
the reduction of reality to the world of motion, passing 
time and physical space (which is to say denial of art‘s 
eternal foundation, the Infinite Substance and its Em-
anations) that forms the root of the Modernist Hege-
monic Essence. Restoring the epistemological poten-
tials implicit in intellectual love and intuition to Plan-
ning Theory and Practice (and the Social Sciences 
more generally) can, then, be understood as reviving 
artistic ethos in Planning Theory and Practice—we 
must eschew the mechanical sociopathy of the peripa-
tetic mind as divorced from loving intuition and the 
reduction of research to the accumulation, categoriza-
tion and dissemination of facts therein and instead 
seek to engage readers with theories, symbols, meta-
phors, etc. that allow for transcendence of irrationality 
and indoctrination through conscious evolution (i.e., 
through remembrance-cultivation of intimacy with the 
dimension of self that is Self, the Infinite Substance 
and its Emanations). Recalling Ouspensky‘s words 
above, ―During the time when psychology was con-
nected with philosophy and religion it also existed in 
the form of Art. Poetry, Drama, Sculpture, Dancing, 
even Architecture, were means for transmitting psy-
chological knowledge‖ (Ouspensky, 1951, p. 5). We 
must (as an academy and as a society) return to an 
artistic ethos (in its traditional mode as a catalyst for 
conscious evolution) in development and dissemina-
tion of academic theory and practice, university 
teaching, public educational curriculum, news media 
discourse, political discourse, etc.  
And thus we return to our initial discussion. Cons-
ciousness expands and constrains our potentials for 
action in the material world. Meaningful social reform 
must come through the evolution of human psycholo-
gy. The evolution of human psychology can be cata-
lyzed through returning to an artistic ethos in the de-
velopment and dissemination of Social Science The-
ory and Practice. Critics might posit this as an ideal-
ists project, and indeed it is, as ―idealism and matter 
of fact are … not sundered, but inseparable, as our 
daily steps are guided by ideals of direction‖ (Geddes, 
1915, p. vii). 
Desire, Reason and the Goodness of Human 
Nature 
The biological man of Modernity, stripped of soul and 
the potential for conscious evolution, has come to be 
known as an evil, self-serving being (Barnesmoore, 
2016a). Love and community are reduced to a self- 
centered desire for biological survival (Haraway, 
1989). Desire is evil, and order is to be created 
through the domination of desire by peripatetic reason; 
social order, civilization, progress and the many fanta-
sies of Liberal Modernity — which is to say our es-
cape from the Modernist Garden of Eden — are to be 
created through domination of our biologically de-
rived desire for survival (Barnesmoore, 2016b). As 
Nature is conceived as evil, a chaotic feminine other 
to be brought into order through forceful domination, 
so too is human nature reduced to the ‗chaotic evil‘ of 
competitive biological desire. This article endeavors 
to transcend the biocentrist social ontology (world 
view) of Modernity and its ravenous biological Man 
in order to rediscover (to remember) the goodness of 
Human Nature, of Terrestrial Nature, the implicit or-
der of the uncreated (i.e. Infinite Substance and its 
Emanations) therein and the road to its actualization 
— we seek to remember and actualize rather than to 
create order. 
Blake‘s Marriage of Heaven and Hell is a dan-
ce between reason and desire. Shedding the paternalist 
desire to dominate desire with reason, to ‗create order‘ 
through hierarchical domination, Blake turns to a uni-
fied vision of desire as the fire of reason — desire as 
what Meng Zi called ‗sprouts of goodness‘ (Blake, 
1790; Zi, 2016) . In Blake‘s words, ―Those who re-
strain Desire, do so because theirs is weak enough 
to be restrained; and the restrainer or Reason usurps 
its place & governs the unwilling. And being re-
strained it by degrees becomes passive till by degrees 
it becomes only the shadow of desire,‖ (Blake, 1790, 
p.5) 
―It indeed appeared to reason that desire had been 
cast out, but the Devil‘s account is that Messiah fell & 
formed a heaven with what he stole from the Abyss. 
This is strewn in the Gospel, where he prays to the 
father to send the comforter or Desire that Reason 
may have ideas to build on…‖ (Blake, 1790, p.5) 
In the words of Meng Zi 
―‗What I mean by saying [human nature] is good is 
that there is that in our nature which is spontaneously 
part of us and can become good. The fact that we 
can become bad is not a defect in our natural endow-
ment. All men possess a sense of commiseration; all 
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men possess a sense of shame; all men possess a sense 
of respect; all men possess a sense of right and wrong. 
The sense of commiseration is the seed of humanity; 
the sense of shame is the seed of righteousness; the 
sense of respect is the seed of ritual; the sense of right 
and wrong is the seed of wisdom. Thus humanity, 
righteousness, ritual, and wisdom are not welded to us 
from outside. We possess them inherently; it is simply 
that we do not focus our minds on them. This is the 
meaning of the saying, ‗Seek for it and you will get it; 
let it go and you will lose it.‘ The reason why some 
men are twice as good as others — or five or countless 
times better — is simply that some men do not ex-
haust their endowment to the full. The Poetry says: 
Tian gave birth to the teeming people, 
For everything there is a norm. 
The constant for people, within their grasp, 
Is love of beautiful virtue‘s form. 
Confucius said, ‗The man who wrote this poem 
certainly understood the Dao!‘ Thus for every type of 
thing there is a norm; that is why the constant that lies 
within people‘s grasp is inherently a love of beautiful 
virtue,‘‖ (Zi, 2016, p.109) 
We come to know the constants of Tian, of heaven,  
which is to say the infinite substance and its emana-
tions, through desire (through silence and the climax 
of motion to be found therein — through feeling from 
nothingness). In the Foucault‘s (1970) rendition of 
knowledge as resemblance, we feel the sympathy of 
manifestation with this uncreated order. Indeed, as the 
climax of motion is desire, so too is the climax of si-
lence motion. We find light in the darkness through 
the flame of reason as it shines through the lamp of 
reason. 
The Way of the Golden Flower reminds us: 
―Everyone already has the lamp of mind, but it is 
necessary to light it so that it shines; then this is im-
mortality…. Cognition is a function of mind, empty 
silence is the substance of mind…. Radiant light is the 
function of mind, empty silence is the substance of 
mind. If there is empty silence without radiant light, 
the silence is not true silence, the emptiness is not true 
emptiness-it is just a ghost cave,‖ (Cleary, 1991, p.66). 
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